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I. INTRODUCTION
Supermarkets in the United States annually spend $450 million to
defend slip-and-fall claims.' In Florida, slip-and-fall cases are one of the
most common types of premises liability suits. 2 Under Florida law, premises
owners, such as supermarkets, owe a duty toward invitees , such as shoppers,
4to exercise reasonable care in the safe maintenance of their premises.
Traditionally, invitees who slipped and fell on a transitory foreign
substance,5 such as a banana peel, were required to prove that the premises
owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.7
Constructive knowledge could be established by circumstantial
evidence, such as the length of time a substance had been on the floor, or
that spills occurred frequently such that the premises owner should have
known about them.8 Thus, the invitee bore the burden of proof. However,
the court's holding in Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,9 changed morethan thirty years of Florida law by eliminating the need to prove actual or
1. Susan R. Miller, Shifting Burden of Proof. Florida Supreme Court's Rule Change
in Slip-and-Fall Cases Gladdens Plaintiff Bar, Infuriates Defense Lawyers and Business
Groups, MIAMI Bus. DAILY REV., Dec. 10, 2001, at 6 [hereinafter Miller I].
2. 6 THOMAS D. SAWAYA, FLORIDA PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH
ACTIONS, § 10.13, at 601 (West Group 2001-2002 ed.) (2001).
3. "Invitee" generally refers to "someone who entered the premises of another for
purposes connected with the business of the owner or occupier." Id. at 563 (citations omitted).
4. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 320 (Fla. 2001) (citing
Everett v. Rest. & Catering Corp., 738 So. 2d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
5. Transitory foreign substance is referred to as "any liquid or solid substance, item,
or object located where it does not belong ... [a] substance found ... where it is not supposed
to be found." Id. at 317 n.1 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999)).
6. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 317.
7. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.12, at 598.
8. Publix Super Mkt., Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (citations omitted); Brooks v. Phillip Watts Enter., Inc., 560 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
9. 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001).
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constructive knowledge and shifting the burden of proof from the invitee to
the premises owner.10 As a result of this ruling, the Florida Retail Federa-
tion, representing 6000 retailers statewide, began damage control and formed
the Banana Peel Coalition in seeking legislative redress." In 2002, Florida's
legislature unanimously rpassed Senate Bill 1946,12 also known as the
Banana Peel Legislation,' creating section 768.0710 of the Florida Statutes,
that will codify the burden of proof in slip-and-fall cases. 14 The bill, in part,
retained the decision in Owens by eliminating the requirement of actual and
constructive knowledge.' 5 However, the burden of proof essentially shifted
back from the premises owner to the invitee,' 6 thus undoing the Supreme
Court of Florida's ruling in Owens.
This article will examine the Owens decision, its effect, and the effect
of Senate Bill 1946. Beginning with Part 11, this article will review Florida's
old slip-and-fall law by examining the general rule, elements, burdens of
proof, and applicable liability theories. Part I will present an overview of
the facts and the court's analysis in Owens, outlining how the court came to
its decision. Part IV will examine the impact of Owens by discussing how
the ruling has changed Florida's slip-and-fall law regarding the duties of
both the plaintiff shopper and the defendant supermarket. Part V will
examine the business community's response to Owens, and the Florida
Legislature's approval of Senate Bill 1946. Part VI will examine the effect
of Senate Bill 1946 by discussing whether the plaintiff shopper and the
defendant supermarket have been equally placed regarding the burden of
proof. Part VII will conclude that although Senate Bill 1946 has settled the
burden of proof in slip-and-fall actions, the plaintiff shopper remains in a
disadvantaged position when compared to that of the defendant supermarket,
because the plaintiff shopper's burden of proof remains great and arguably
difficult to satisfy. Further, in accordance with the Supreme Court of
Florida's notation in Owens, the defendant supermarket is in a superior
10. John Kennedy, Court's Banana-Peel Act is No Joke, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov.
16, 2001, 2001 WL 28423739 [hereinafter Court's Banana-Peel Act Is No Joke].
11. A Slippery Slope, Florida Ruling Could Trigger an Avalanche of Slip-and-Fall
Suits, CHMAN STORE AGE, Mar. 1, 2002, at 104, 2002 WL 11205724 [hereinafter A Slippery
Slope].
12. Act effective May 30, 2002, Ch. 2002-285, 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. 873 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.0710).
13. Banana Peel Coalition Legislation Passes Committee, Feb. 22, 2002, at
http://www.flchamber.con/home/FBAR_020222.asp (last visited July 05, 2002).
14. Ch. 2002-285, 2002 Fla. Laws 2125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.0710).
15. See id. § 1(2)(b).
16. See id. § 1(2).
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position because it has immediate access to its own reports, records, and in
today's supermarkets, surveillance of the premises. '
7
II. FLORIDA'S SLIP-AND-FALL LAW BEFORE OWENS V. PUBLIX
SUPERMARKETS, INC.
Prior to the court's decision in Owens, Florida's slip-and-fall law was
clear: in order for a premises owner to be liable for an invitee's injuries, the
injured invitee had to prove the premises owner had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition. 1
A. Actual and Constructive Knowledge Required in Slip-and-Fall Actions
Under Florida law, a premises owner owes a legal duty to exercise
reasonable care in the maintenance of his or her premises against dangerous
conditions.' 9 The exercise of reasonable care toward an invitee includes:
[Tiwo legal duties .... First... [the premises owner shall] ascer-
tain that the premises are reasonably safe for invitees [includ-
ing] ... reasonable care to learn of (i.e. to acquire actual knowl-
edge as to) the existence of any dangerous conditions on the prem-
ises. Secondly, the premises [owner] has a... legal duty to use
reasonable care to protect invitees from dangerous conditions of
which the [premises owner] has actual knowledge.20
If a premises owner had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition,
such as a slippery substance on the floor, then the premises owner had a
21legal duty to remedy the condition. If a premises owner lacked actual
knowledge of a slippery substance on the floor, but the substance was there
for a sufficient length of time, the premises owner could be charged with
22constructive knowledge. Thus, premises owners were required to conduct
timely inspections in order to discover those dangerous conditions of which
23they did not actually know. Constructive knowledge could be established
17. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 330 (Fla. 2001).
18. Id. at 320.
19. Id.
20. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (citations omitted).
21. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.6, at 566.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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by circumstantial evidence. 24  Sufficient circumstantial evidence shows
either, "(1)... the dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that
in the exercise of ordinary care, the [premises owner] should have known of
the condition.., or (2)... the condition occurred with regularity and was
therefore foreseeable."25
In the former situation, whether the length of time a transitory foreign
substance remained on the floor was sufficient to establish constructive
26knowledge depended on the facts and circumstances of each case.
27However, the general guideline has been fifteen to twenty minutes.
Typically, the length of time would be determined by the slip-and-fall
plaintiff's ability to describe the condition and appearance of the sub-
28
stance. However, Florida appellate courts have differed on whether the
description was sufficient to charge the premises owner with constructive
knowledge. The Third District has held that the description of transitory
foreign substance as "'very dirty,' 'trampled,' 'containing skid marks, scuff
marks' ... 'chewed up,"' is sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a
jury question of constructive knowledge. 29 For example, evidence of water
around a bag of peas lying on the floor in the frozen food section could be
enough for a jury to conclude that the water was a result of the bag of peas
thawing out over some time, and thus the defendant supermarket was put on
notice of the dangerous condition.3 ° Still, other Florida appellate courts have
held the description ' of the substance, without more, as insufficient
circumstantial evidence to charge the defendant supermarket with construc-
tive knowledge. 3' For example, if a shopper slipped and fell on a piece of
cake on the floor and the shopper could not describe the condition of the
24. Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302, 306 (Fla. 1973);
Woods v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Brooks
v. Phillip Watts Enter., Inc., 560 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Nance v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 436 So. 2d 1075, 1076 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Amended
Petitioners Initial Brief on Merits at 14, Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315
(Fla. 2001) (No. 95, 667) (citations omitted).
25. Brooks, 560 So. 2d at 341 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
26. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 603 (citations omitted).
27. Teate v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 524 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Williams, 264 So. 2d 862, 864 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972).
28. Woods, 621 So. 2d at 711.
29. Id.
30. Teate, 524 So. 2d at 1061.
31. Publix Super Mkt., Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
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cake to suggest its length of time on the floor, the issue of constructive
knowledge would be precluded from the jury.32 Yet, the Second District has
held that, even if the description of the transitory foreign substance was
available to suggest its length of time on the floor, the description was still
insufficient circumstantial evidence.
Florida courts have also held that constructive knowledge may be
34
established under the theory of foreseeability. Foreseeability is based on
the idea that when an occurrence or spill occurs with regularity, the
occurrence is foreseeable, and the premises owner is charged with a legal
duty to reasonably inspect the premises so as to determine whether a
substance has been spilled.3' For example, the Second District noted that, in
a supermarket setting, it is foreseeable that shoppers will handle fruits and
vegetables, will open packages, and will drop parts of those items on the
36floor. Because such occurrences are foreseeable, the supermarket owes a
duty toward shoppers to reasonably inspect the floors in order to discover the
presence of hazards, such as slippery substances. 37 Reasonable inspection of
38the floors would prevent a shopper from falling and sustaining injury.
B. Negligent Mode of Operation Theory
The negligent mode of operation theory is an alternative method
available to meet the requirement of constructive knowledge for injured
parties who slipped and fell as a result of a transitory foreign substance on
the floor. 39 This method is most crucial in cases where the timespan in
which a transitory foreign substance had been on the floor cannot be
32. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d at 406.
33. Bates v. Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., 182 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
34. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d at 215; Cain v. Brown, 569 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990); Nance v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 436 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Amended Petitioners Initial Brief at 14-15, Owens (No. 95, 667); 6 SAWAYA,
supra note 2, § 10.13, at 602.
35. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 603.
36. Cain, 569 So. 2d at 772.
37. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 602.
38. Id.
39. John H. Hickey, Slip and Fall Cases: Alternative Theories of Liability or Using
the Negligent Method of Operation and Negligent Maintenance Theories, ATLA ANNUAL
CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS, MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION, HIGHWAY, AND PREMISES
LIABILITY SECTION, 779 (July 2001).
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established. 40 Rather, liability rests on the idea that the premises owner
created a dangerous condition through his or her own repeated conduct.4'
A negligence action based on the mode of operation theory requires the
injured party to prove "1) either the method of operation is inherently
dangerous, or the particular operation is being conducted in a negligent
manner; and 2) the [dangerous] condition of the floor was created as a result
of the negligent method of operation."
42
One commentator explained the application of the two-prong test in a
supermarket setting.43 If grocery items are being served in open bins and are
likely to drop on the floor and thus cause a fall, the method of operation is
inherently dangerous and thus the first prong of the test is satisfied." If the
injured party could then show that the grocery item on the floor was in close
proximity to where it was shelved or being served, the second prong of the
test should also be satisfied4 5 However, Florida courts have been reluctant
to accept the negligent method of operation theory in a supermarket setting,
primarily because displays are not inherently dangerous.4
The negligent mode of operation theory has been more easily applied to
public amusement places.47 More than fifty years ago, the Supreme Court of
Florida was faced with the application of this theory in Wells v. Palm Beach
48Kennel Club. In that case, large groups of individuals went to the
racetrack.49 The racetrack sold bottled beverages but failed to provide any
bins to dispose of the empty bottles.50 The patrons threw the empty bottles
on the floor.5' A patron tripped and fell on an empty bottle in one of the
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 6 SAWAYA, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 603-04.
43. Hickey, supra note 39, at 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 324 (Fla. 2001) (citing
Publix Super Mikt. Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406-07 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(rejecting cake sample display as inherently dangerous or negligently maintained)); Rowe v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting
application of negligent mode of operation to the supermarket setting); Schaap v. Publix
Supermarkets, Inc., 579 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting store's
cookie program as negligently maintained or inherently dangerous).
47. Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 35 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1948).
48. 35 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1948)
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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aisles and sued the racetrack. 2 Based on the negligent mode of operation
theory, the court held it was for the jury to decide whether the racetrack was
negligent in the manner in which it sold its bottled beverages. 3 Thus, the
issue for the jury was whether the racetrack's failure to provide garbae bins
for the disposal of its empty bottles created a dangerous condition. If a
jury found that the racetrack implemented a negligent method of operation,
then it follows that it was the creator of the dangerous condition. 5
Therefore, constructive knowledge is not an issue.
5 6
iH. OWENS V. PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC.
A. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.: A Plaintiff's Attorney's Dream
Come True
Because the Supreme Court of Florida was faced with the issue of
whether the condition of a transitory foreign substance in a slip-and-fall
action is, alone, sufficient to charge the premises owner with constructive
knowledge in two cases,57 the court consolidated these cases into one
opinion.
1. Facts of Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.
Evelyn Owens ("Owens") was a part-time employee of Publix
Supermarkets, Inc.5 9 After finishing her day at work, Owens decided to do
some grocery shopping. 6 While walking down an aisle and looking at the
61. 62
shelved merchandise, Owens slipped and fell. At trial, Owens testified
52. Id.
53. Wells, 35 So. 2d at 721.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 323 (Fla. 2001).
57. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (en banc); Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc., 757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999).
58. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 317 n.2.
59. Amended Petitioners Initial Brief on Merits at 1, Owens v. Publix Supermarkets,
Inc., 802 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001) (No. 95, 667).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 317.
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63that she did not see what caused her to slip and fall. However, a witness in
close proximity to Owens at the time of the incident testified that Owens had
slipped on a small piece of slightly discolored banana.6 Although the
witness could not testify as to the length of time the banana had been on the
floor, she was able to describe it as "'a piece of banana' without the
peel.., about an inch or longer and 'kind of mushed... where she hit
it. . . kind of squashed down.' ... It wasn't black, but it was dark. 65 It
was undisputed b6 Publix that Owens was an invitee at the time of her slip-
and-fall incident. As a result of Owens's fall, she was transported to the
hospital, treated and released, but was unable to work for several weeks.67
Owens provided two theories charging Publix liable for her injuries: "[1] the
length of time the substance was on the floor [and] ... [2] foreseeability and
4,8failure to warn. Through discovery it was revealed that, on average,
Publix experienced one or more slip-and-falls per month,69 in the nine
months prior to Owens's incident. On the day of trial, but before
presenting testimony, Owens asked the court's permission for a jury
demonstration to show the length of time it would take a small piece of fresh
peeled banana to discolor.7' Owens reasoned that, "'[the] banana ... must
have been sitting there for a while, because it takes more than a few minutes
for it to turn brown.', 72 Nevertheless, the court denied the request because
the "[demonstration] didn't matter: There was insufficient evidence to show
Publix was liable.,
73
At the end of Owens's case-in-chief, Publix moved for a directed
verdict.74 Publix argued Owens failed to present evidence that it had actual
or constructive knowledge of the banana peel on the floor.75 The trial court
76relied on Bates v. Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., because the facts in that
63. Id.
64. Amended Petitioners Initial Brief at 1, Owens (No. 95, 667).
65. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 317.
66. Amended Petitioners Initial Brief at 1, Owens (No. 95, 667).
67. Id.
68. Id. at4.
69. Id.
70. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318 n.3.
71. Amended Petitioners Initial Brief at 6, Owens (No. 95, 667).
72. Court's Banana-Peel Act Is No Joke, supra note 10.
73. John Kennedy, Slip-and-Fall Plaintiffs Will Have Day in Court, SUN-SENTINEL,
Nov. 16, 2001, at 6B, 2001 WL 29955409.
74. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318.
75. Id.
76. 182 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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case were similar to the facts in Owens. In that case, a shopper also fell on
a banana peel described as "'dark,' 'over ripe,' 'black,' 'old,' and 'nasty
looking."" 8 The Bates court ruled in favor of the premises owner, holding
that the color and condition of the banana peel, as the only evidence, would
require a jury to impermissibly stack inferences.79 In other words, the jury
would be required to "stack a second inference (because of the color of the
item the premises owner should have known of its existence) upon the first
inference (the item was not that color when it was placed on the floor). 80
Thus, applying the holding in Bates to Owens, the trial court concluded that
the condition of the banana was insufficient evidence to hold Publix liable. 8,
82Therefore, the trial court granted the directed verdict in favor of Publix.
Owens appealed.
83
On appeal, the Fifth District reversed the directed verdict but upon
rehearing en banc, it affirmed the trial court's decision8 4 In doing so, the
Fifth District framed the issue to be: "'Does the fact that a piece of
discolored banana is found on the floor give rise to an inference that [it] had
been there long enough to give this critical constructive knowledge?"' 85 The
court's response was "'it depends on the other circumstances of the case.
' 86
Reviewing the circumstances in Owens, the Fifth District pointed out two
possible theories as to how the banana got on the floor.87 First, the aging of
the banana may have occurred on the floor; second, the aging of the banana
may have occurred in the store's fruit bin from which a shopper took it and
gave it to an infant being pushed in a shopping cart, who then dropped it on
the floor just prior to Owens walking down the aisle in which it lay.88 In
77. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (en banc).
78. Bates v. Winn-Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., 182 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
79. Id.
80. Motion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So.
2d 315 (Fla. 2001) (No. 95,667).
81. Owens, 729 So. 2d at 450.
82. Id.
83. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing to Owens, 729 So. 2d at 449).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318.
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order for Publix to be charged with constructive knowledge, the Fifth
District would have had to agree with the former theory and not the latter.s9
The Fifth District held that because there were two possible theories as
to how the banana got on the floor, Owens bore the burden of proof in
regards to where the aging of the banana actually occurred. 9° In reaching its
conclusion, the Fifth District relied on Montgomery v. Florida Jitney Jungle
Stores, Inc.,9 1 where the plaintiff provided the court with "additional
circumstances" to establish the length of time the transitory foreign
substance was on the floor. 92 These additional circumstances included 1) the
time span the plaintiff was in the area of the fall prior to the accident; 2)
whether other individuals were in the area of the fall; 3) whether store
employees swept the floor during that period; 4) whether store employees
were in the area of the fall; and 5) the description of the transitory foreign
substance.93 Thus, when comparing the evidence in that case with the
Owens's case, the Fifth District, in a 6-2 vote, concluded that there were no
"additional circumstances" to justify the inference that Publix had
constructive knowledge.
94
Judge Sharp, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that the Montgomery
court was not faced with the issue of whether the condition of the item, by
itself, was sufficient to create a jury question on constructive knowledge.
However, Judge Sharp stated that the decision in Montgomery should not be
extended to include the proposition that additional evidence is needed other
than the condition of the substance for an injured party to withstand a
directed verdict.96 In Owens, Judge Sharp stated that Owens presented
sufficient evidence to charge Publix with constructive knowledge even
though Owens did not see what caused her fall.97 More specifically, Judge
Sharp pointed out that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence because
there was a witness who testified that she was 1) in close proximity to where
Owens fell; 2) saw what caused Owens's fall; 3) described the substance as a
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 281 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1973).
92. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 318 (citing Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 306).
93. Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 303. In Montgomery, the transitory foreign substance
was collard leaves that the slip-and-fall plaintiff described as "old, wilted and dirty looking."
Id.
94. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
95. Id. at 452.
96. Id.
97. Id. at451.
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piece of banana that was discolored, kind of mushed, squashed down, and
dark; and 4) that it looked like it was there for a while. 98
2. Facts of Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.
99
Elvia Soriano ("Soriano") was a frequent shopper at B & B Cash
Grocery Stores, Inc. ("B & B Grocery").'m After finishing her Sunday
afternoon of shopping at B & B Grocery, she proceeded to the store's exit,
and while pushing her shopping cart, she slipped and fell to the ground.' 0 '
After a store manager helped Soriano get up, he pointed out that she had
slipped and fallen on a banana peel and scraped it off the sole of her shoe.10 2
Soriano described the piece of banana peel as "brown with very little yellow
on it,"'0 3 and stated, "it looked like a rotten banana because of the condition
of the peel."' °4 At trial, Soriano was able to testify to the description of the
banana peel but unable to testify to the length of time the banana peel was on
the floor. °5 In an attempt to rebut the inference that the banana peel was
rotten because it was on the floor for a sufficient length of time, B & B's
store manager, Jose Alvarez ("Alvarez"), testified "the store sold only clean,
nice, yellow bananas.., not... darkened, browned out bananas, since
customers generally do not like to buy brown bananas."' 6 Alvarez also
testified that, based on his knowledge, the length of time a banana takes to
turn from yellow to brown is one to two days. 10 7 However, he also stated
that it was not uncommon for shoppers to eat the store's grocery items while
shopping and then drop some of the item on the floor. 18 Further, he testified
"that he considere[d] a banana on the floor a hazard... [and] something he
would want picked up 'immediately."'' 9
98. Id.
99. 757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
100. Brief on Merits of Petitioners at 1, Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.,
757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 96, 235).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. However, it was revealed that Soriano did not see the banana nor did she
know how long it had been on the floor. Brief of Petitioners at 1 n. 1, Soriano (No. 96, 235).
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Brief of Petitioners at 3, Soriano (No. 96, 235).
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Although B & B Grocery required employees to make an hourly
inspection of the store's premises and fill out a report after each inspection,
Alvarez admitted that these reports were only completed at one time-rather
than hourly or even daily-by the assistant manager on duty on Saturday
nights. 0  Furthermore, none of the reports ever indicated that any
substances or debris were found on the floor. Based on Alvarez's
admission, these reports were being falsified." 2 Apparently, falsified reports
were common practice among all B & B Grocery stores.' 3 Although an
assistant manager filled out an accident report on the day of Soriano's
accident, the report failed to describe the color of the banana or indicate
whether an employee had been in the area of the accident shortly before
Soriano fell."14 This information might have made a critical difference in the
outcome of Soriano's case. As a result of the accident, Soriano sustained a
fractured kneecap and sued B & B Grocery for her injury based on two
theories. " 5
Soriano alleged, first, that B & B Grocery had constructive knowledge
that the banana peel was on the floor because it was there for a sufficient
length of time, and second, that B & B Grocery had a negligent method of
operation." 6 The trial court granted a directed verdict for B & B Grocery
and the Fourth District affirmed." 7 The Fourth District held that Soriano's
contention that B & B Grocery had constructive knowledge was based upon
an impermissible stacking of inferences. 18 Also, the Fourth District held
that the condition of the banana peel, by itself, was insufficient evidence."9
Rather, the Fourth District held that additional evidence like "cart tracks,
footprints, dirt, or even grit," 2° was necessary to establish that the banana
peel had been on the floor for a sufficient length of time necessary to charge
B & B Grocery with constructive knowledge. 21 As to Soriano's contention
that B & B Grocery was negligent in its mode of operation, the Fourth
District rejected the application of this theory to a supermarket setting as an
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id. at 3-4.
112. Id. at4.
113. Id.
114. Brief of Petitioners at 5, Soriano (No. 96,235).
115. Id. at 6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Brief of Petitioners at 6-7, Soriano (No. 96,235).
120. Id. at 7.
121. Id.
2002]
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alternative to the traditional requirement of establishing actual or construc-
tive knowledge in a slip-and-fall action.
22
B. Analysis of Owens: An Overview of the Law as it Was
In analyzing Owens, the Supreme Court of Florida's forty-two page
opinion began with an overview of Florida's slip-and-fall law by first
targeting the required element of actual or constructive knowledge as related
to transitory foreign substance cases,123 followed by a review of the mode of
operation theory, 124 and ending with an examination of what other
jurisdictions have done. 125
1. Plaintiffs Traditionally Required to Prove Actual or Constructive
Knowledge
In the Supreme Court of Florida's decision to eliminate the required
element of actual or constructive knowledge, the court first considered the
type of circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to create a jury issue. 21 In
doing so, the court referred to its decision almost thirty years ago in
Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc.12 7
In that case, the plaintiff had slipped and fallen on a collard leaf. The
evidence presented was that
[1] she had been in the area of the fall for fifteen minutes before
falling; [2] no other shoppers were in the area when she fell; [3] no
employee swept the floor while she was there; [4] two employees
were nearby when the accident occurred; [5] the collard leaf upon
which she slipped was old, wilted and dirty looking; and [6] water
was on the floor where she fell. 129
In Montgomery, the Supreme Court of Florida was not faced with the
issue of whether the condition of the collard leaf, by itself, was enough to
122. Id.
123. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 320 (Fla. 2001).
124. Id. at 323.
125. Id. at 324.
126. Id. at 320.
127. Id. (citing Montgomery v. Fla. Jitney Jungle Stores, Inc., 281 So. 2d 302, 303
(Fla. 1973).
128. Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 303.
129. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 321 (citing Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 303).
[Vol. 27:191
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charge the premises owner with constructive knowledge.' 30  Rather, the
Montgomery court noted that circumstantial evidence could be used, and
because there was conflicting evidence as to the timespan the collard leaf
was on the floor, the issue was for the trier of fact.
131
Acknowledging the unclear standard set by the court in Montgomery,
Florida appellate courts were left with little guidance. 132 To illustrate the
effect of the ruling in Montgomery, the court cited to those appellate courts
that have held the description of the transitory foreign substance as
sufficient. 133 For example, the First District held in favor of the injured par
who described the substance as partially melted butter with lumps in it.'
Likewise, the Third District held the description of a substance as "'ver
dirty,' 'trampled,' 'containing skid marks, scuff marks' and 'chewed up,"
and "ice cream [that] was thawed, dirty, and splattered,"'' 36 as sufficient. The
Fourth District has also agreed that the description of the substance was
enough where the plaintiff described the substance to look like "sauerkraut
[that] was 'gunky, dirty and wet and black,"",137 or where the plaintiff
described the substance as "'old, nasty' and 'looked liked [it] had been there
for a quite a while. '" 138 Hence, if a plaintiff were unable to provide the trial
court with at least the description of the transitory foreign substance so as to
establish the length of time it was on the floor, appellate courts have
' 39
affirmed the trial court's ruling in favor of the premises owner.
130. Id. (citing Owens, 729 So. 2d at 451 (Sharp, J., dissenting)).
131. Id. (citing Montgomery, 281 So. 2d at 303).
132. Id. (stating that since Montgomery, Florida appellate courts have been split on
whether the condition and description of the transitory foreign substance are sufficient
circumstantial evidence to create a jury issue of constructive knowledge).
133. Id.
134. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 321 (Fla. 2001) (citing
Ramey v. Winn Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 710 So. 2d 191, 192-93 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998)).
135. Id. (quoting Woods v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 710, 710-11 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
136. Id. (citing Canina v. Parliament Ins., Co., 417 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)).
137. Id. (quoting Ress v. X-tra Super Food Ctrs., Inc., 616 So. 2d 110, 110-11 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
138. Id. (quoting Washington v. Pic-N-Pay Supermarket, Inc., 453 So. 2d 508, 509
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
139. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 321-22. The following cases were provided as illustrations
where the issue of constructive knowledge was precluded from the jury because the plaintiff
could not describe the substance:
20021
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Conversely, the court noted that even in those cases where the plaintiff
offered some evidence of the transitory foreign substance's aging or
deterioration, one appellate court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's
holding in favor of the premises owner."40 To illustrate this decision, the
court utilized the Bates case relied on by the majorities in Owens and
Soriano.141 In that case, the shopper slipped and fell on a banana peel, just
as in Owens and Soriano.42 As evidence of the supermarket's constructive
knowledge, the shopper offered the description of the banana peel as "'dark,
over ripe, black, old and nasty looking."",143 Even with the description of the
banana peel as evidence of its aging, the Second District affirmed the trial
court's holding in favor of the supermarket because the inference drawn
from the color and condition of the banana (i.e. the length of time it was on
the floor) would first have to be drawn from the inference that it was not
already deteriorated when it first fell to the floor.' 44  The Second District
stated, "'that this is the type of mental gymnastics [that is] prohib-
ited.., since the latter inference.., is not to the exclusion of all other
reasonable inferences."",1
45
However, that holding was rejected by the Third District in Teate v.
146Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., where the shopper provided the description of the
substance on the floor so as to charge the supermarket with constructive
knowledge. 47 In Teate, the shopper
Publix Super Market, Inc. v. Sanchez, 700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (a piece of cake was on the floor, but there was no evidence as to how long it
had been on the floor); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. King, 592 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (slippery, oily, clear substance, but no evidence of "signs of age,
such as skid marks, smudges, or the like"); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553
So. 2d 213, 21(41 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (slippery substance, but no evidence as
to how or when it got on the floor, or the length of time it was there before the fall);
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Gaines, 542 So. 2d 432, 432 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(loose dried rice and beans, but no evidence that they appeared old or were ground into
the floor or crushed, and no evidence of broken packages).
Id. at 322.
140. Id. at 322 (citing Bates v. Winn Dixie Supermarkets, Inc., 182 So. 2d 309, 310
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Bates, 182 So. 2d at 309).
144. Id. (citing Bates, 182 So. 2d at 311).
145. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 322 (quoting Bates, 182 So. 2d at 311) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
146. 542 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
147. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 322 (citing Teate v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 542 So. 2d
1060, 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
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presented evidence that there was some water on the floor around
the peas... contend[ing] that the water was there because the peas
had been on the floor for some time and had thawed. The jury
could believe this and find that the peas had been on the floor for a
sufficient time to put Winn Dixie on notice of the dangerous condi-
tion. Winn Dixie counter(ed] that the water was a result of "perma-
frost" or ice crystals on the bag of peas that instantly melted when
it hit the floor. The jury could choose to believe this argument,
find the peas had fallen perhaps only seconds before the fall, and
decide there was insufficient notice.
Because there was conflicting evidence as to how the water around the peas
resulted, the Third District held the issue was for the trier of fact to
determine and rejected the supermarket's contention that the jury would be
impermissibly stacking inferences. 149  To explain its holding, the Third
District stated that the existence of the water on the floor was for the jury to
decide based on the direct evidence offered by the plaintiff shopper and the
defendant supermarket. 150 Based on that direct evidence, the jury was only
required to make one inference.'
5
'
In reviewing the required element of actual and constructive knowl-
edge, the court recognized that case law has created constructive knowledge
as the linchpin of liability. 5 2 Thus, an injured party's likeliness of surviving
a directed verdict or summary judgment depended on the injured party's
ability to actually see the condition of the transitory foreign substance that
caused his or her fall.'
5 3
2. Negligent Mode of Operation Theory Historically Restricted from the
Supermarket Setting
In reviewing the mode of operation theory as an alternative to the
required element of constructive knowledge, the court recognized it had
never extended the mode of operation theory to a supermarket setting.'5
Rather, the court explained that this theory had been more easily applied to
business premises such as racetracks where a large number of people
148. Id. (quoting Teate, 542 So. 2d at 1061) (alteration in original).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 322 (citing Teate, 542 So. 2d at 1061).
151. Id. at 323.
152. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 323.
153. Id.
154. Id.
2002] 207
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congregate by invitation. 155 In such a scenario, the court stated that by the
very nature of the business or its mode of operation, the required element of
constructive knowledge is irrelevant.
156
"Although [the] court has never extended the mode of operation theory
to a supermarket... setting, neither has th[e] [c]ourt... rejected [it]."' 1
The court reflected back to its decision over fifty years ago in Carls Markets,
Inc. v. Meyer,158 where it stated that if the premises owner was the creator of
the dangerous condition, logic dictates that the creator had knowledge of the
dangerous condition, and would thus be liable for the creation of it, as was
the case in Wells. 159
3. Overview of Other Jurisdictional Approaches in Slip-and-Fall Cases
Struggling with what to make of Florida's precedence on constructive
knowledge in slip-and-fall cases, the Supreme Court of Florida examined
how other jurisdictions have handled transitory foreign substance actions.'0
The court noted that other jurisdictions, such as Kansas, have acknowledged
155. Id.
156. Id. In Wells, the court rejected the racetrack's contention that the patron failed to
prove actual or constructive knowledge holding that a heightened standard of reasonable care
is applied to places of public amusement where thousands of people are invited, and the
premises owner sells bottled beverages and fails to provide a place for their disposal causing
the bottles to be thrown anywhere on the premises. Therefore, the failure to provide a place of
disposal for the empty bottles charged the premises owner with negligence as to its mode of
operation. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 323 (citing Wells, 35 So. 2d at 721 (citations omitted in
original)).
157. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 323.
158. 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
159. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 324 (citing Carls Mkts., Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 791
(Fla. 1953)). The court referred to the following listed examples rejecting the negligent mode
of operation theory in supermarket settings: Rowe v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 714 So. 2d
1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting the application of the negligent mode of
operation theory to a supermarket holding that the supermarket was not the creator of a
dangerous condition by having an unattended seafood salad display where another customer
spilled the salad causing another shopper to slip-and-fall); Publix Super Mkt., Inc. v. Sanchez,
700 So. 2d 405, 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting application of negligent mode of
operation theory to supermarket where supermarket had an unattended cake sample table,
against store policy, at time plaintiff slipped and fell); Schaap v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,
579 So. 2d 831, 833-34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting the application of negligent
mode of operation theory to supermarket that implemented a "cookie program" giving out free
cookies to children where plaintiff alleged supermarket's program was inherently dangerous
causing plaintiff's slip-and-fall on what was described as a small piece of cookie).
160. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 324.
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the principles of premises liability as traditional, thus requiring "a broad
[modem] trend toward liberalizing the rules restricting recovery by one
injured on the premises of another."16 1 In taking a modem approach, the
court stated that other jurisdictions first identified historical observations and
policy considerations. 62 Borrowing from other jurisdictions, the Supreme
Court of Florida provided four policy considerations to justify a liberal trend
away from the traditional principles of premises liability law:
[1] the evolution of modem merchandise marketing techniques, in-
cluding self-service, have increased the likelihood of spills and
breaks occurring. 163 [2] [A] store adopting the self-service tech-
nique should reasonably anticipate certain types of accidents and
therefore is already on notice .... 164 [3] [B]ecause the self-service
technique allows for lower overhead and greater profits, the busi-
nesses that adopt [this] ... technique are in a better position to pre-
• • 165
vent and attend to the risks involved. [4] [I]t is unfair to place
the burden on the customer to establish actual or constructive no-
tice of the condition on the part of the premises owner or operator
when the defendant is in control of its own premises and the evi-
dence on which notice is based.'
66
Giving great weight to these policy considerations, the Supreme Court
of Florida stated that other jurisdictions have, as a result, shifted the burden
of proof from the injured party to the premises owner, and extended the
mode of operation theory to a supermarket setting in transitory foreign167
substance actions. The Supreme Court of Florida found holdings in other
jurisdictions justifying the burden-shifting analysis based on the premises
owner being in a superior position to know of how the dangerous condition
161. Id. at 324-25 (quoting Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 840 P.2d 463, 467 (Kan. 1992)
(citations omitted)).
162. Id. at 325.
163. Id. (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983);
Gonzales v. Winn Dixie La., Inc., 326 So. 2d 486, 488 (La. 1976)).
164. Id. (citing Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 733 P.2d 283, 286 (Ariz.
1987)).
165. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 325 (citing Gump v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 P.3d 418, 434
(Haw. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 5 P.3d 407 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted
in original); Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888, 891 (Wash. 1983) (citations omitted in
original)).
166. Id. at 325 (citing Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 221 A.2d 513, 514-15
(N.J. 1966)).
167. Id.
2002]
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was created when compared to the position of customers.16  In addition,
self-service stores, by their very nature, display items on the shelves that
may likely be dropped by customers.169 Therefore, stores are required to
minimize that risk through reasonable care by conducting timely inspections
and cleanups.170  This consideration, as the Owens court stated, lead the
Supreme Court of Louisiana to create a rebuttable presumption of negli-
gence, thus shifting the burden of Proof from the customer to the storeowner
to prove that it was not negligent.' Even if the dangerous condition was the
created by a third party, the Supreme Court of Louisiana still held that the
burden was on the storeowner to prove that it exercised reasonable care by
conducting timely inspections, because in supermarket settings, it is
foreseeable that spills and breaks will occur.172 However, subsequent to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana's holding, the Louisiana Legislature codified
"the requirement of actual or constructive knowledge into [the state's]
statute," thus overruling that court's ruling.
173
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Colorado was in accordance with
Louisiana and New Jersey in recognizing an exception to the requirement of
constructive knowledge in cases where the store's mode of operation created
dangerous conditions, and were thus foreseeable. 74 Referring to Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 75 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that the Supreme
Court of Colorado found that in supermarkets a customer's access to shelved
items carries with it the increased risk of spills and breaks, thus creating a
dangerous condition. 76  As such, actual or constructive knowledge is
inconsequential. 77 In considering the evidence presented in Smith, the court
gave great weight to the testimony of the store manager who had over
eighteen years of experience. 178 In his testimony, he stated that spills were
168. Id. (citing Wollerman, 221 A.2d at 514-15 (citations omitted)).
169. Id. at 326 (citing Gonzales, 326 So. 2d at 488).
170. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 326 (citing Gonzales, 326 So. 2d at 488 (citations omitted)).
171. Id. (citing Kavlich v. Kramer, 315 So. 2d 282, 285 (La. 1975) (citations omitted
in original) (affirming that once the plaintiff establishes that the piece of banana was there and
that he or she slipped and fell because of it, the burden shifts to the premises owner to rebut
the presumption of negligence)).
172. Id. at 326-27 (citing Gonzales, 326 So. 2d at 488-89).
173. Id. at 326 n.9.
174. Id. at 327 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983)
(citations omitted)).
175. 658 P.2d 255 (Colo. 1983).
176. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 327 (citing Smith, 658 P.2d at 257 (footnote omitted)).
177. Id. at 328.
178. Id. at 327-28 (citing Smith, 658 P.2d at 257 n.3).
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common, and the existence of substances on the floor was not unusual. 179
Further, the Smith court stated that it would be unreasonable to place the
burden on the plaintiff to prove that the store was negligent when it was
within the store owner's own knowledge whether the store took reasonable
steps to discover the dangerous condition.18°
In surveying other jurisdictional approaches in premises liability cases,
the Supreme Court of Florida noted that although not all jurisdictions have
adopted a burden-shifting analysis, other jurisdictions have instead extended
the negligent mode of operation theory to the supermarket setting, thereby
eliminating the requirement of constructive knowledge.' 8' The Supreme
Court of Florida referred to Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Arizona, Inc.,182
where the Supreme Court of Arizona stated, "[t]he 'mode-of-operation' rule
looks to a business's choice of a particular mode of operation and not events
surrounding the plaintiff's accident. Under this rule, the plaintiff is not
required to prove notice if the proprietor could reasonably anticipate that
hazardous conditions would regularly arise."'
8 3
That holding was consistent with, and accepted by, other jurisdictions
that have also held that, because storeowners implement self-service systems
as its mode of operation, the storeowners are imputed with the knowledge of
their customers' conduct;184 and where the store's mode of operation creates
the dangerous condition, the dangerous condition is thus foreseeable and the
element of notice is irrelevant.
85
The Supreme Court of Florida continued by noting that other
jurisdictions, such as Wisconsin and Vermont, that are reluctant to eliminate
constructive knowledge, have at least made it easier for a plaintiff to meet
the requirement by first eliminating the burden of proving that the substance
existed for a sufficient amount of time prior to the fall and the failure of the
storeowner to provide evidence of reasonable care.is6
Overall, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that there is
"clearly... [a] modem jurisprudential trend of departing from the traditional
179. Id. at 328.
180. Id. (citing Smith, 658 P.2d at 258 (citations omitted in original)).
181. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 328.
182. 733 P.2d 283, 285 (Ariz. 1987).
183. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 328 (quoting Chiara v. Fry's Food Stores of Ariz., Inc., 733
P.2d 283, 285 (Ariz. 1987)) (citations omitted).
184. Id. (quoting Dumont v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., 664 A.2d 846, 849 (Me.
1995)).
185. Id. (quoting Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 666 P.2d 888, 893 (Wash. 1983) (citing
Jackson v. K-Mart Corp., 840 P.2d 463, 470 (Kan. 1992)).
186. Id. at 328-29 (citations omitted).
2002]
21
Zilieris: Florida's Slip-and-Fall Law, Abandoned and Re-Established: Owens
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
rule of premises liability when a plaintiff slips and falls on a transitory
foreign substance. 1 87 The Supreme Court of Florida reiterated the fact that
other jurisdictional case law has recognized the unfairness placed on
plaintiffs by requiring them to meet the element of constructive knowledge
particularly in a supermarket setting where items regularly fall and the risk
of slips are foreseeable. 1
88
C. Outcome of Owens: A Drastic Departure from Florida's Precedent
After the Supreme Court of Florida's in-depth overview of Florida's
precedent and other jurisprudential trends, it decided that today's supermar-
ket settings in Florida required a little change in premises liability law
involving transitory foreign substance actions.
1. Proof of Actual and Constructive Knowledge Eliminated
The Supreme Court of Florida reached several conclusions in both
Owens and Soriano. 89 First, the court held that the directed verdicts granted
to the defendant supermarkets were erroneous because even under prior case
law the plaintiffs offered sufficient evidence, that is, the condition of the
banana peel, which gave rise to a reasonable inference that the aging
occurred on the floor. 19° Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
holdings of other appellate courts regarding the theory of impermissible
inference stacking.191 Rather, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the
Third District's holding in Teate where the court stated "the mere fact that
there may be alternative explanations inconsistent with the deterioration
occurring on the floor does not render the circumstantial evidence of
constructive knowledge fatally deficient."' 192 Moreover, the Supreme Court
of Florida stated that the appropriate analysis in these cases is that of
Montgomery and held that the substance's condition gave rise to a
reasonable inference that it aged on the floor.' 93  Further, the issue of
whether the dangerous condition was a result of the store's failure to make
187. Id. at 329.
188. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 329.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing Teate, 524 So. 2d at 1061).
193. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 329.
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timely inspections and discover it is a question for the jury to decide.' 94
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the appellate court's
reliance on Bates and approved Judge Sharp's dissenting opinion in
Owens,195 where Judge Sharp stated that the condition of a substance is
sufficient to create a jury issue on constructive knowledge. 9%
Based on premises liability case law and its interpretation and
application of traditional rules, the Supreme Court of Florida believed that
prior case law had improperly deviated its focus from the duty of premises
owners to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises to an
injured party's ability to prove actual or constructive knowledge. 197 The
effect of doing so left the success of plaintiff's case being tried dependent on
whether the plaintiff could essentially provide an exact description of the
condition of the transitory foreign substance.198 Further, the court observed
that premises owners were unjustly benefiting from their own lack of record-
keeping because plaintiffs, as in Owens and Soriano, are often unable to
prove when the floors were last maintained.199
In Soriano, the injured customer produced evidence of 1) the condition
of the banana peel; 2) the supermarket's lack of record-keeping establishing
the stores inability to know when the area was last maintained; and 3) the
testimony of the store manager who stated that it was common for customers
to eat and drop food on the floor.2° Thus, the issue considered by the court
was whether the store's lack of record-keeping should give rise to an
inference that the store failed to exercise the degree of care proportionate to
the foreseeable risk of injury.2°! Because the store manager testified that it
was common for shoppers to eat and drop grocery items on the floor, the
court noted it was foreseeable that such hazards would occur.2°2
Reiterating that premises owners owe a legal duty to maintain the
premises in a reasonably safe condition, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that a transitory foreign substance on the floor is an unsafe condition.2 °3
194. Id.
195. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 729 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (en banc) (Sharp, J., dissenting).
196. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 330.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 330.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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204Therefore, the court concluded that supermarkets, particularly nowadays,
should be aware of potentially unsafe conditions created as a result of the
operation in which the supermarket is carried out.2°5 The court explained
that today's supermarket shoppers are forced to focus on items that are
shelved and are thus distracted from the floor on which they walk.206
Moreover, because supermarkets are in a superior position to show when the
premises were last maintained, they are also in a better position to know
what actually happened by instigating an immediate investigation including
interviews with witnesses and taking photographs. 2°7 Based on these factors,
the court concluded that the burden-shifting analysis, as adopted by other
jurisdictions, is appropriate for Florida's transitory foreign substance
cases.
208
Thus, the court placed the burden on the storeowner to prove that he or
she exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. 209 As a result, the
shopper's obligation to prove that the storeowner had actual or constructive
knowledge of the unsafe condition was eliminated. 2 '0 Therefore, in
transitory foreign substance cases the plaintiff's burden is substantially
diminished because the plaintiff, in addition to proving the premises owner
owed a duty, is now only required to prove 1) a substance was on the floor;
2) the plaintiff slipped on the substance and fell; and 3) the plaintiff suffered
211injuries. Once the plaintiff establishes these elements, "a rebuttable
presumption... arises" and shifts the burden to the storeowner to prove, "by
the greater weight of evidence, that it [did] exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of the premises. 212  The court justified its adoption of the
burden-shifting analysis from a policy perspective stating that premises
owners, as a result of this decision, will adopt or increase the "protective
measures [necessary] to prevent foreseeable risks. 213 The basic effect is to
allow a jury to make the ultimate factual determination of "whether the
204. Id. (including self-service marts, cafeterias, fast food restaurants and similar
businesses).
205. Id.
206. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 330.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 331.
209. Id.
210. Id. (finding a plaintiff's burden to establish the length of time a substance was on
the floor as artificial).
211. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 331.
212. Id. (holding that "circumstances could include the nature of the... hazard and the
nature of the... [premises owner's] business").
213. Id.
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premises owner ... exercised reasonable care" in the maintenance of its
premises.214
As a result, the Supreme Court of Florida held that because in both
Owens and Soriano the condition of the banana peel was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish the supermarket's constructive
knowledge, both cases were remanded where a jury would decide whether
the aging occurred before or after the banana fell to the floor.215 In addition,
each supermarket will bear the burden to rebut the presumption that it failed
to maintain its floors in a reasonably safe manner.
2. Negligent Mode of Operation Theory Extended to Supermarket Settings
In regard to the mode of operation theory and its traditionally restricted
application to a supermarket setting, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected
its restriction and acknowledged the theory as one of "continued viabil-
ity.,'217 The issue under this theory would be "whether the specific method of
operation was negligent and whether the accident occurred as a result of that
,,2 219
negligence. 218 Thus, actual or constructive knowledge is not an issue.
Rather, the plaintiff need only produce evidence of a "specific negligent
mode of operation such that the premises owner could reasonably" foresee
220
an unsafe condition arising because of that method. In other words, a
supermarket "must prove [it] exercised reasonable care" by inspecting and
"cleaning up spills rather than requiring injured [shoppers] to prove [that
the] store employees were negligent., 22'
However, the Owens court rejected the application of the negligent
mode of operation theory in Soriano because Soriano only produced
evidence establishing that the supermarket employees failed to sweep as
222required by store policy and timely fill out inspection reports. The courtfound Soriano's allegation to be a "general claim of negligence" in
214. Id.
215. Id. at 332.
216. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 319, 332.
217. Id. at 332.
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Mark Albright, Florida's High Court Places Burden of Proof on Grocers in Slip-
and-Fall Cases, ST. PETMSBURG TimEs, Nov. 16, 2001, 2001 WL 30267234.
222, Owens, 802 So. 2d at 332.
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maintaining the floors rather than a "specific claim of negligent mode of
operation.
Chief Justice Wells emphasized in his concurring opinion that the duty
owed by premises owners toward invitees to "maintain [their floors] in a
reasonably safe condition" is the real issue, rather than, whether the
premises owner had "constructive knowledge of an unsafe condition."
224
Moreover, Chief Justice Wells noted that evidence of establishing lack of
actual knowledge and issues of care are determinations based on apportion-
225ment of fault and not duty. Because these issues focus on facts, Chief
Justice Wells concluded that these factual issues are for the jury and not the
judges. 226 Although Chief Justice Wells concurred with the Owens majority,
he disagreed with the majority's opinion concerning the viability of the
227
negligent mode of operation theory as applied to supermarkets.
In addition, Justice Harding concurred with the majority, however, he
disagreed with the majority's discussion on "the shortcomings of traditional
premises liability" law, finding that the majority unnecessarily rewrote
Florida's slip-and-fall law.228
IV. IMPACT OF OWENS
Plaintiffs' attorneys were ecstatic, defense attorneys were stunned, and
business premises owners were in a panic. Legal experts labeled the Owens
decision a landmark case because the Supreme Court of Florida did away
with Florida's traditional slip-and-fall standard established in Montgom-
229
ery. Prior to the decision in Owens, a shopper had to prove the supermar-
ket had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition, that is, the
supermarket "knew or should have known that the treacherous mess was on
,,230the floor and still failed to clean it up, an almost impossible burden. As a
result of the Owens ruling, the shopper is merely required to prove that he or
231
she slipped and fell and was injured. At that point, the supermarket must
223. Id.
224. Id. at 333 (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
225. Id. (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
226. Id. (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
227. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 332 (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
228. Id. at 333-34 (Harding, J., concurring in result only).
229. Kennedy, supra note 10.
230. Susan R. Miller, Legislature Passes Bill on Slip-and-Fall Cases, MIAMI DAILY
BUS. REV., Mar. 26, 2002, at 7 [hereinafter Miller H].
231. Owens, 802So. 2dat331.
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prove that it exercised reasonable care to keep the premises safe.232 The
rebuttable presumption was viewed as a translation into "guilty until proven
innocent, because to rebut the presumption storeowners must produce
"evidence such as inspection reports, surveillance video[s], or testimony" on
what precautions it took to ensure the safe condition of its floors.23"
Now armed with the court's ruling, Owens was ready to go back to
235
court. Envious attorneys only wished this decision came sooner, because
prior to Owens, attorneys were forced to reject roughly "nine out of ten slip-
and-fall cases" solely because the burden of proof was so hard to meet.236
One recent commentator stated that the Owens decision "strained an
already tense relationship between" the Supreme Court of Florida and
Florida's "republican leadership and business community. 237 As such, a
"lobbying battle... over legislation to protect the owners of [business]
premises" was a possibility in the very near future.23 8 Defense attorneys
believed the Owens decision "set a dangerous precedent [by opening the]
floodgates to frivolous lawsuits. 239  While, on the other end, plaintiffs'
attorneys argued that Florida's old law prevented cases from going to the
jury due to the unclear guidelines set in Florida's precedent. 2  As a result of
this decision, plaintiffs' attorneys believed Florida's new rule provided
clearer guidelines with the burden of proof fairly allocated. 24  As one
attorney stated, "'the real significant difference... is that... [plaintiffs
will] never.., get a directed verdict anymore. ' ' '242  However, business
defense attorneys argued that the "ruling undermine[d] the fundamental
principle that plaintiffs bear the burden of proof in negligence actions.
24 3
Puzzled and shocked by the court's flip-flop of Florida law, accusations of
financial motivation were made where one attorney stated, "'[t]his is just
another example of shifting financial responsibility to those that the judicial
232. Id.
233. Banana Peel Coalition Legislation Passes Committee, at http://www.flchamber.
con/home/FBAR_020222.asp (last visited July 05, 2002).
234. Miller I, supra note 1.
235. Kennedy, supra note 10.
236. Miller I, supra note 1.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Miller I, supra note 1.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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system perceives can afford to pay.'244 Thus, the court is viewed by some
as just "another government mechanism for the redistribution of wealth. 245
Moreover, to avoid the risk of large jury awards, storeowners will be forced
to settle.2 6
Because of Owens, storeowners will not only be forced to better
maintain their floors but must also develop better inspection methods that
will enable them to prove the precautionary safety measures implemented so
247as to avoid, allegations of negligence. The exercise of reasonable care in
maintaining premises in a safe condition is not a new duty but one
248traditionally imposed on premises owners. What this duty entails, as the
Owens decision reflects, is that supermarkets must do more than declare that
a floor maintenance system exists. Rather, the maintenance system must be
implemented and religiously carried out if a supermarket wishes to avoid
liability.249 Some supermarkets, like B & B Grocery in Soriano, theoreti-
cally had inspection and maintenance methods for the purpose of fulfilling
its duty as a premises owner.250 However, as the store manager of B & B
Grocery testified, the inspections were not carried out as scheduled and
required by store policy. 25' Further, the inspection reports were all
completed at one time, by one person, and were falsified. 52 Based on these
facts, it is fair to say that B & B Grocery is the poster supermarket for failing
to fulfill its legal duty to exercise reasonable care toward its shoppers in the
maintenance of its floors in a safe condition.
Conversely, supermarkets that do implement and carry out a floor
maintenance system have still been accused of negligence by shoppers that
alleged they slipped and fell.253 However, some allegedly injured shoppers
were arrested in South Florida because they were "staging falls in supermar-
244. Id.
245. Law: Case on a Peel, THE FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville) Feb. 5, 2002, 2002
WL 5956771.
246. Meg Major, Slipping Beneath a Heavy Burden: Until They Can Get Some
Legislative Help, Florida Retailers Have a Lot More to Worry about When Customers File
Slip-and-Fall Suits, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, Feb. 1, 2002, at 10, 2002 WL 11887712.
247. Miller I, supra note 1.
248. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Marcotte, 553 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
249. Major, supra note 246.
250. Brief on Merits of Petitioners at 3, Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.,
757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 96, 235).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Law: Case on a Peel, supra note 245.
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kets to collect awards and settlements. 254 Thus, the ruling in Owens could
also shield a supermarket by compelling it to implement better precautionary
protective measures because those measures will prove the supermarket is
free from liability in instances where the shopper is faking to make a buck.
However, a National Floor Safety Institute representative stated that even
though supermarkets spend $1.5 billion each year in the maintenance of their
premises, they have been inattentive toward slip-and-fall incidents because
supermarkets have traditionally had an upper hand under the old Florida
255law. Supermarkets did not have to implement better preventive methods
because supermarkets had a "history of winning these types of [cases]."
256
In other words, no supermarket would improve a faulty system when the
lower and higher courts had traditionally protected it from liability. , Now
that supermarkets have to perfect their systems and, for some, implement a
system to avoid the likeliness of a jury trial, supermarkets will be forced to
actually train employees,257 conduct regular scheduled floor walks, and
maintain accurate and detailed records, such as sweep logs.2 9 Or will
they?
V. EVERYONE BUT THE PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO OWENS: NO WAY!
A. Florida Retail Federation Takes Immediate Action
In response to Owens, the Florida Retail Federation ("Federation")
immediately took action to reduce the damage caused by what it called an
errant decision" and formed the Banana Peel Coalition. It believed the
Supreme Court of Florida created a "new profit center for trial lawyer
industry," by increasing the number of slip-and-fall cases to go before the
261jury. With nowhere else to turn, the Federation worked on legislative
approaches stating that "'[1]egislation is the only thing you have left when
the Supreme Court [of Florida] dumps you out the front door."' 26 2 Thus, a
two-page bill was drafted in an attempt to undo the Owens decision by
254. Id.
255. Miller I, supra note 1.
256. Id.
257. A Slippery Slope, supra note 11.
258. Major, supra note 246.
259. A Slippery Slope, supra note 11.
260. Susan R. Miller, Slip and Fall into Spring, BROWARD DALY Bus. REv., Feb. 8,
2002, at 3 [hereinafter Miller III].
261. Major, supra note 246.
262. Miller I, supra note 1.
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shifting the burden back to the plaintiff.263 The Federation's vice-president
of governmental affairs and political action, Bill Herrle, stated that the bill
was not an attempt to overrule the decision in Owens but only an "effort to
exert the [1]egislature's prerogative in writing statutes, ' 264 that included
returning back to the common law standard implemented under Florida
law.
265
After negotiations between the Federation and the Academy of Florida
Trial Lawyers, a joint letter was sent to the Florida Senate in attempt to have
the bill passed in 2002.266 The joint letter expressed that Senate Bill 1946
was a "compromise to both sides... [that would] avoid a protracted
legislative battle., 267 While the Federation's attempts were threatening to
plaintiffs, the general counsel for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers was
not too worried when he stated that the Florida Legislature would be too
268busy to even consider the bill. Even the Federation believed that the odds
of receiving legislative redress in 2002 would be unlikely since the Florida
Legislature is "busy, distracted, and strained., 269 However, that viewpoint
proved to be wrong.
B. Florida Legislature Quickly Reacts and Unanimously Passes Senate Bill
1946 Settling the Burden of Proof
Senate Bill 1946, 27 considered the most significant litigation-related
bill, 27 was unanimously passed in Florida's 2002 legislative second session
263. Susan R. Miller, Time Slips Away as Deadline Approaches, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REv., Jan. 15, 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Miller VI].
264. Id.
265. Miller VI, supra note 263.
266. Joint Letter from Rick McAllister, President & CEO, Florida Retail Federation
and Scott Carruthers, Executive Director, The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, to the
Honorable John McKay, Florida Senate (Mar. 21, 2002) (on file with the Florida Retail
Federation).
267. Id.
268. Miller VI, supra note 263.
269. Major, supra note 246.
270. Ch. 2002-285, § 1, 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. 2125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.0710). Senate Bill 1946 reads, in part,
An act relating to the burden of proof in negligent actions involving transitory foreign
objects or substances; creating s. 786.0710, F.S.; providing requirements with respect
to the burden of proof in claims against persons or entities in possession or control of
business premises; providing for the application of the act; providing an effective date.
WHEREAS, on November 15, 2001, the Florida Supreme Court decided the case
of Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., Case No. SC95667 & SC96235, and
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and became effective as of May 30, 2002."' In response to the ruling in
Owens, the bill created section 768.0710, of the Florida Statutes, to settle
the burden of proof in transitory foreign substance cases involving business
premises owners.273 The bill is said to "reassert an equitable division of
burdens in slip-and-fall cases." 274 The bill retained the traditional rule of
imposing a legal duty on premises owners to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of their premises in a safe condition, including the maintenance
275of premises free from foreseeable hazards. Like the ruling in Owens, the
bill does not require the plaintiff to prove actual or constructive knowledge
and extends the negligent mode of operation to the supermarket setting.276
However, unlike the decision in Owens, the bill essentially shifts the burden
of proof back to the plaintiff who must now show
[1] The... [premises owner] owed a duty to the [plaintiff]; [2] The
[premises owner] acted negligently by failing to exercise reason-
able care in the maintenance, inspection, repair, warning, or mode
of operation of the business premises; [and] [3] The failure to exer-
cise reasonable care was the legal cause of the loss, injury, or dam-
277
age.
Thus, Senate Bill 1946 now arms the plaintiff with additional liability
theories, including the duty to exercise reasonable care in warning. This
theory was argued by the supermarket in Owens as "inviting the court to
WHEREAS, the Florida Legislature has considered the issues raised and law
surveyed in the Owens case when balancing rights and duties between possessors of
land and invitees upon the land, NOW, THEREFORE,
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida.
Id.
271. Randolph Pendleton, Reprieve, For Now Busy with Budgets and Redistricting,
Lawmakers Give Bar and Courts a Pass, MiAMi DAILY Bus. REv., Apr. 12, 2002, at Al.
272. Ch. 2002-285, § 1, 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. 2125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.0710).
273. Id.
274. Press Release, Florida Retail Federation, Florida legislature Provides Slip and Fall
Relief to Florida Businesses (Mar. 25, 2002), at http://www.frf.org/files/p9 l.pdf.
275. Ch. 2002-285, § 1, 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. 2125 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.0710).
276. See id. § l(2)(b), 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. at 873. Although the bill does not
require the plaintiff to prove actual or constructive knowledge, evidence establishing notice,
or lack of it, may be submitted and considered by either party. Id.
277. Ch. 2002-285 § l(2)(a)(b)(c), 2002 Fla. Sess. Law Rep. at 2126.
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,,278
proceed down the path to strict liability against premises owners. Under
this theory, supermarkets would presumably have to place signs such as
"'[w]arning, it is foreseeable that food can fall to the floor. Please watch for
that possibility.' 279 However, the Florida Legislature clearly disagreed with
that argument by including it in Senate bill 1946. After all, supermarkets
post warning signs of wet floors as common practice. Thus, it is not unfair
to expect at least that same level of reasonable care for other hazardous
conditions, such as slippery grocery items.
VI. PLAINTIFF SHOPPER OR DEFENDANT SUPERMARKET: WHICH HAS THE
UPPER HAND Now?
Hence, the decision in Owens was undone, as sought by the Florida
Retail Federation. 280 Nevertheless, Senate Bill 1946 is considered a
compromise and noted "as a rare agreement between the plaintiff bar and the
business community. '28 ' For the plaintiff, the only significant compromise
is the elimination of constructive knowledge because it was this element that
"erected a roadblock to recovery." 28 2 For the defendant supermarket, the real
significant compromise is shifting the burden back to the plaintiff.283 The
new Florida burden of proof statute requires the plaintiff, who has been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Florida as an inferior par28 to
prove issues of care prior to even litigating the issue before a jury. As
Chief Justice Wells noted in his concurring opinion in Owens, issues of care
are based on facts not as a matter of law and should thus be left to the trier of
fact. 286 Although the statute provides a plaintiff shopper with a number of
liability claims against defendant supermarkets, the plaintiff shopper's
burden of proof remains great because the plaintiff shopper's knowledge
287remains inferior, as the Owens court and other jurisdictions have held. As
the Owens court stated, supermarkets have access to its inspection records,
and the opportunity to immediately investigate, interview witnesses, and take
278. Respondent's Brief On the Merits at 22, Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802
So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2001) (No. 95, 667).
279. Id.
280. Miller I, supra note 1.
281. Pendleton, supra note 272.
282. Miller I, supra note 1.
283. Miller H, supra note 230.
284. Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d 315, 330 (Fla. 2001).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 333 (Wells, C.J., concurring in result only).
287. Id. at 330 (citations omitted).
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photographs.28' Thus, the Florida Legislature did more than put business
premises owners in a "more level playing field,"289 because as it was
revealed in Soriano, it is fair to say that supermarkets are likely to have a
common practice of falsifying inspection records.290 Therefore, the Florida
Legislature, in effect, lends support to the defendant supermarket's lack of
record keeping, a sloppy habit the Supreme Court of Florida intended to
correct.
291
VII. CONCLUSION
The tug of war on who bears the burden of proof in slip-and-fall actions
is now settled law. By passing Senate Bill 1946, the Florida Legislature
shifted the burden of proof back to the slip-and-fall plaintiff. In accordance
with the Supreme Court of Florida, the plaintiff shopper is no longer
required to prove actual or constructive knowledge of the slippery substance
that caused his or her fall. Still, the plaintiff shopper does bear the burden to
prove that the defendant supermarket failed to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining the premises free from hazards, including those that are
foreseeable, through its inspection, repair, warning, or mode of operation. In
one way, the effect of Senate Bill 1946 benefits the slip-and-fall plaintiff by
eliminating the burden to prove constructive knowledge, a requirement that
once barred the case from the jury. In another way, Senate Bill 1946
benefits the defendant supermarket by shifting the burden of proof back to
the plaintiff. Whether the plaintiff shopper or the defendant supermarket is
more, less, or equally likely to prevail under Florida's new law will
ultimately be determined by the plaintiff shopper's likeliness of meeting his
or her new burden. Although the plaintiff shopper's burden of proof has
changed by extending the number of liability theories under which the
defendant supermarket may be charged, the burden remains great, as it was
in prior case law.
288. Id.
289. Miller II, supra note 230.
290. Brief on Merits of Petitioners at 4, Soriano v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc.,
757 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (No. 96, 235). Store manager testified that he
and other managers knew that B & B Grocery stores falsified reports. Id.
291. Owens, 802 So. 2d at 330.
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